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Public Goods Games represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions between individuals.
However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern
societies, they are not able to reproduce some key features observed in social and economical interactions.
The typical shape of wealth distribution – known as Pareto Law – and the microscopic organization of wealth
production are two of them. Here, we introduce a modification to the classical formulation of Public Goods
Games that allows for the emergence of both of these features from first principles. Unlike traditional Public
Goods Games on networks, where players contribute equally to all the games in which they participate, we
allow individuals to redistribute their contribution according to what they earned in previous rounds. Results
from numerical simulations show that not only a Pareto distribution for the payoffs naturally emerges but also
that if players don’t invest enough in one round they can act as defectors even if they are formally cooperators.
Finally, we also show that the players self-organize in a very productive backbone that covers almost perfectly
the minimum spanning tree of the underlying interaction network. Our results not only give an explanation for
the presence of the wealth heterogeneity observed in real data but also points to a conceptual change regarding
how cooperation is defined in collective dilemmas.
PACS numbers:
One of the key elements of human and animal societies
is the interaction between groups of individuals to achieve a
common goal. The study of cooperation and coordination be-
tween individuals has always attracted the attention of scien-
tists from very different fields, ranging from biology[1] and
sociology[2, 3] to economy[4, 5]. On the theoretical side,
scientists have tackled this problem using the tools offered
by evolutionary game theory[6–9], using among others, Pub-
lic Goods Games (PGG)[12–15]. Mathematically, PGG are
usually represented as the N-person version of the prisoner’s
dilemma[16–19] where individuals can decide to contribute
(cooperate) or not (defect) to the creation of the public goods.
The added value generated by the public goods is modeled
by a synergy factor r that multiplies the collected investments
resulting in a benefit that is divided equally between all the
participants of the group. Then, to mimic the effect of evo-
lution on the two strategies an evolutionary rule is applied to
all players simultaneously[6, 9–11]. Despite of its simplic-
ity, this representation shows a very rich behavior and demon-
strated itself able to reproduce important traits of real world
societies.
RESULTS
Recently the search for more realistic models led to
the formulation of several modifications of the traditional
setup of the PGG. In this direction, one of the first steps
has been the introduction of a structure in the popula-
tion to take into account the complex interaction patterns
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FIG. 1: Schematic representation of public goods games on net-
works. In the classical framework (left panel) an individual with
four neighbors participates in five different games: the one centered
on herself and other four centered on her neighbors and divide her
contribution c evenly. In our model (right panel), contributions can
be assigned unevenly according to the payoff obtained in the previ-
ous round, allocating more resources in more profitable games with
a higher probability.
present in real societies[21–23]. Simultaneously, other ef-
forts have been put in mimicing realistic traits of our so-
cieties like reputation[24], reward[25, 26] and punishment
mechanisms[27–31], human mobility[32–39] and different
types of social heterogeneity[40–51]. Heterogeneity seems
to play a fundamental role in cooperative behavior -although
some results question the role of network heterogeneity [52,
53]-, and several works have dealt with the effects of allowing
an uneven distribution of players’ resources[47–51]. How-
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FIG. 2: Fraction of cooperators fc as a function of the enhancement
factor r for different values of α. Results show that there is an in-
crease in the levels of cooperation for highly heterogenous resource
allocation (positive values of α, see legend). The interaction topol-
ogy is an uncorrelated scale-free network[55] with exponent γ = 2.5
and N = 104 nodes. Each point represents an average over at least
500 runs with randomly chosen initial conditions.
ever, even if the latter studies have helped to understand the
emergence of cooperation in large groups, key aspects of the
organization of human societies and markets still remain un-
explained; a relevant example being the typical wealth distri-
bution observed in economic systems, which cannot be ob-
tained within the formalism of classical PGG.
Here, we address the previous shortcomings and consider a
modification of the classical N-person prisoner’s dilemma on
networks. In our model, players are allowed to distribute their
investments unevenly, allocating more resources to profitable
games and less in unfavorable ones. In the classical formu-
lation of PGG on networks each neighborhood is considered
as a group and individuals participate in different groups ac-
cording to the number of their neighbors. Thus a player with
m neighbors will contribute to m+ 1 distinct games (the one
centered in her and the m centered on her neighbors) and will
divide equally her capital c between all the groups. In our set-
ting, players decide how to distribute their capital according
to what they earned in previous rounds (Fig. 1). We employ
a simple distribution function with a parameter α allowing a
linear α = 1.0 or non-linear α > 1.0 allocation of the re-
sources; α = 0 recovers the classical formulation with equal
investments in all the games (see Methods for model’s details).
Computer simulations of our model for different values of
the allocation parameter α show that when individuals are al-
lowed to distribute their investments unevenly, an increase in
the cooperation level is observed with a shift of the critical
synergy parameter rc to lower values (Fig. 2) with respect to
the static allocation scheme (α = 0). The increase in coop-
eration is more marked for larger values of α while negative
values of the parameter – i.e. invest more in less remunera-
tive games – lead to a substantial decrease of both the critical
synergy factor rc and the levels of cooperation. Even though
these results are consistent with previous studies on similar
models[47–51] the mechanisms behind this increase and their
consequences on the organization of the system are still un-
clear.
Microscopic organization
To address these questions, we focus on the region where
cooperation dominates (r > 3.5) and look how individuals
distribute their investments. Fig. 3 depicts the distribution of
the fraction of total investments Ii,j for all the players (see
Methods for details) once the system reached a stationary
state. For the static resource allocation (α = 0) the invest-
ment distribution clearly follows the degree distribution of the
underlying social graph as players only can distribute their
contribution evenly between all the games in which they par-
ticipate. The picture totally changes even when we consider
a linear allocation of the investments. As α increases from
0, the investment distribution rapidly become more heteroge-
nous. Beyond α = 2, two large peaks centered respectively
at very large (> 0.95) and very small (¡ 0.05) values of Ii,j
appear.
Results shown in Fig. 3 suggest that, once players are free to
allocate their resources, a very peculiar organization emerges.
The peak for large values of the investments indicates that
most of the players (almost the totality for α ≥ 3.0) allo-
cate the majority of their resources in only one market – the
most profitable one – while they distribute evenly between all
the other games the remaining part of their capital creating
the peak for small values of Ii,j . The previous findings could
explain the observed increase in players’ cooperation[47–51],
but it is not the only consequence of the observed investment
distribution. Indeed, an established result in public goods
games is that the most connected nodes – the hubs – are re-
sponsible for the emergence of cooperation and for the pro-
duction of the majority of the payoff. However, the results
in Fig. 4 depict a totally different scenario. If we consider
the total normalized payoff produced in games centered on
nodes of degree k, Πk/(k + 1), we find that, in the classi-
cal case, it is distributed almost homogeneously among all the
degrees, with a mean value around 0.15 (Fig. 4a). However,
for α > 0 strong differences arise. As α increases, the dis-
tribution of the payoff for games taking place on low degree
nodes starts to become more heterogenous until, finally, for
α = 3.0 (Fig. 4d) a large number of games produce very high
payoffs (note that the maximum payoff does not depend on k,
as max{Πk/(k + 1)} = c(r − 1)). This means that all the
players invested all their contributions in that game. More-
over, with the increase of α the average payoff produced in
the hubs decreases substantially.
These results, also at the light of the investments’ distribu-
tion (Fig 3), indicate a radical change in the social structure of
the system. While in classical PGG, hubs represent the driv-
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FIG. 3: Distribution of the investments Ix,y over network’s links for different values of the resource allocation parameter α at the steady state.
A radical change in the distribution is observed from the static case α = 0 (panel a), in which the investments follows the degree distribution of
the underlying network, to the profit-driven case α > 0 (panels b,c and d) in which the invested quantity in a game is related to the previously
earned payoff in that game. For non-linear resource allocation α > 1.0 (panels c and d) a two-peaked distribution appears where players
decide to put almost the totality of their resources in one game and invest a minimal quantity in other games. The substrate topology is an
uncorrelated scale-free network[55] with exponent γ = 2.5 and N = 104 nodes. The synergy factor r is set to r = 4.0 and c = 1.
ing force and the centers where the majority of the wealth is
produced, in our model, games on poorly connected nodes are
responsible for the creation of the largest part of the public
goods. Specifically, our results demonstrate that individuals
self-organize in a large number of small sized clusters formed
exclusively by cooperators where all the players invest almost
their entire capital. This paradigm shift also has other interest-
ing consequences that will be discussed in the next sections.
Wealth distribution
One of the criticisms to the classical N-persons’ prisoner’s
dilemma (also on heterogeneous social structures) is that it
fails to reproduce the wealth distribution observed in real eco-
nomic systems – the so-called Pareto principle[54] – where
the 80% of the total wealth is generated by the 20% of the
population. This is mainly due to the fact that, even if games
centered on hubs provide higher payoffs because many play-
ers participate in them, they are only a small fraction of the
population (surely much less than the 20%) and are not able
to significantly change the overall wealth distribution. As in
our model cooperators tend to form small but very produc-
tive clusters it is interesting to look at the wealth distribution
produced for different values of α.
The colored area in Fig. 5 indicates the 80% of the cumula-
tive fraction of the total normalized payoff produced by nodes
ranked from the most to the least productive ones. In the clas-
sical PGG almost the 70% of the nodes are required to reach
the 80% of the wealth while for a quadratic (α = 2.0) resource
allocation setup, this value reaches approximatively the 24%
and for higher α becomes more stable and asymptotically ap-
proaches the 20% (see SI). Given that we have not imposed
any rule on the PGG other than a stochastic investment mech-
anism and a replicator-like evolution of the strategies,, it can
be said that the resulting Pareto Law is obtained from first
principles.
Negative links
The uneven investment distribution observed in Fig. 3 also
has another important implication for the games’ dynamics. In
fact, we noted that if the contribution of a player i in a game
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FIG. 4: Normalized payoff Πk/(k + 1) obtained in the game centered at node i as a function of the degree k for different values of the
parameter α. For the static case, α = 0 (panel a), a low dispersion around a mean payoff value is observed for all degrees k. Increasing α
leads first to an increase in the normalized payoff and its dispersion, most notably for small degrees. A further increase of α produces a second
cloud of points localized at the maximal contribution (e.g., c(r-1)) and low degrees (panels b through d). The other parameters are the same as
in Fig. 3.
is significantly smaller than the average of the other ones, the
payoff obtained by the other players is smaller than what they
would obtain if player i did not participate, i.e., if the link
between i and the focal player of the game doesn’t exist. In
this context it is important to notice that, even if player i is
formally a cooperator, for that specific game she is acting as a
sort of defector as her presence has the effect of reducing the
income of other players. Mathematically this condition can be
represented by the following inequality:
r
kj + 1
∑
l∈νj
Il,j(t)sl(t)
 < r
kj
 ∑
l∈νj\i
Il,j(t)sl(t)
 (1)
where νj represents all the neighbors of agent j while νj \
i stands for the same set excluding player i. An important
implication of Eq. (1) is that it allows to classify every directed
link according to whether it is verified or not. In this way
we can define a link as positive if eq. 1 is not satisfied – the
contribution on the link is large enough to create an added
value in the game – or, in the opposite way, a link as negative
if the contribution of player i is small enough to satisfy eq. 1
implying that the absence of the link would be beneficial for
the other players of the game.
By analyzing how the two types of links are organized we
can dissect the entire network in two subgraphs: one formed
only by negative links and the other containing the positive
ones. The analysis of the two networks brings about un-
expected results. We found that in almost all the realiza-
tions the two networks were connected graphs (only in few
cases the positive network presented some isolated nodes)
and, more importantly, in all the cases the positive network
had a backbone-like structure with similar topological features
of the minimum spanning tree of the original network. On the
other hand, the negative network always includes the major-
ity of the links and its structure strictly resemble the original
one (the details of the topological analysis and the comparison
between the positive network and the minimum spanning tree
are given in the SI). Also visually (Fig. 6) the difference be-
tween the two networks are notable with the positive network
formed by long chains of poorly connected nodes resembling
the spanning tree. It is worth stressing that this backbone orga-
nization of the links at the entire network level spontaneously
emerges as a consequence of the self-organization of the play-
ers at the local level without any control mechanism.
Finally, it is also noteworthy that even if all the presented re-
sults have been obtained in the so-called fixed cost per player
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FIG. 5: Cumulative fraction of the total normalized payoff produced
in the network as a function of the nodes ranked from the most pro-
ductive to the less productive ones for several values of α. The col-
ored regions depict the 80% of the total wealth. For the static and
linear resource allocation cases (α = 0.0 and 1.0) more than the
60% of the nodes is needed to produce the 80% of the total wealth
while for non linear resource allocations almost the 20% of the nodes
produces alone the 80% of the wealth, resembling a Pareto law[54].
Results represent the average over at least 500 different initial condi-
tions. The other parameters are the same as in Fig. 3.
paradigm where each individual has the same capital c, our
results qualitatively hold also for the opposite case of a fixed
cost per interaction paradigm, where players have a capital c
for each game (link) in which they participate (see SI). In ad-
dition, to further prove the robustness of our findings we also
test different evolutionary rules beyond the finite size equiva-
lent of the replicator dynamics like unconditional imitation,
the Fermi rule and a Moran process. In all the cases (not
shown) the results reveal the same qualitative behavior and
very small quantitative differences.
DISCUSSION
Even though heterogeneity has been recognized as one of
the most effective mechanisms to favor cooperation in evolu-
tionary games[40–51] some of its consequences still remain
uncovered.
Aimed at shedding light on the organization of cooperation
in public goods games, in this paper we have focused on a dif-
ferent rule for investments that allows players to allocate their
resources unevenly. Although this modification might appear
not significant, it leads to a radical paradigm shift that can
help us explain social and economic hierarchies observed in
our complex society. Specifically, despite of its simplicity, our
model offers a first-principled explanation of the Pareto Law
for wealth distribution[54]. This result is a direct consequence
of the bimodal distribution of investments observed in Fig 3,
resulting from a behavior in which players invest the major-
ity of their contribution in one game creating small productive
clusters of nodes. Although the emergence of those clusters is
responsible for the heterogeneity observed in the cumulative
payoff distribution (Fig. 5) the reason why this 80− 20 rule is
so stable for a large range of values of α are still unclear and
surely deserve further studies.
The heterogenous payoff distribution is not the only conse-
quence of the uneven investment allocation. Analyzing how
players distribute their contribution we also found that if the
investment on one link is below the threshold given by Eq. (1),
the presence of the link is detrimental for the other players
leading to a lower payoff. This result imposes a change in
how we think about cooperation in evolutionary game theory
as one player can act as a cooperator in one game (link) and as
a defector in others. This concurrent behavior makes it more
meaningful to speak in terms of cooperation in games rather
than of cooperators. That is, it suggests that in some contexts,
the term cooperation should be carefully used, and that it may
be more natural to change the reference of cooperation from
players to games.
It is also important to note that the presence of these so-
called negative links is not an exclusive feature of our model
but it represents a usual situation also in the classical formu-
lation of PGG on heterogeneous networks with the fixed cost
per player paradigm. To clarify this point, it is instructive
to focus on a toy example. Let’s consider a simple network
composed by a ring of n nodes in which each node is con-
nected only to its two nearest neighbors and to a hub placed
at the center of the ring, i.e., a wheel-like configuration. In
this case, the hub will have degree n while the other nodes in
the ring degree 3. In the fixed cost per player setup, the hub
will be involved in n + 1 games and its contribution in each
game will be c/(n+ 1) while the other nodes will participate
in 4 different games and contribute to each c/(3 + 1). It is
straightforward to demonstrate that in the games centered on
the the leaves for n > 4 Eq. 1 holds for all possible values of
r and c. In this case even if the hub is formally a cooperator
its presence reduces the payoff obtained by all the other nodes
in the ring.
Eq. 1 allowed us also to classify contributions as negative
or positive and to split the original network into two layers
each one made up of links of the same type. Astonishingly, we
found that not only players self-organize their positive links to
create highly productive groups but also at a higher level they
tend to form a backbone of the entire network. The structure
we found strictly resembles the minimum spanning tree of the
original interaction network and in most of the cases cover
more than 90% of the agents in the system.
Finally, taken together, our findings not only explain the in-
crease in cooperation observed in previous studies[47–51] but
also can help to understand the basis behind the heterogeneity
in wealth distribution observed in almost all human societies
and give a hint about the organization and functioning of large
economic systems. Our results also impose a radical change
in our idea of cooperation in evolutionary game theory as they
demonstrate that also in the classical formulation of Public
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FIG. 6: Visualization of the networks obtained considering only negative (panel a) and positive (panel b) links from the same original network
of size N = 300. The original graph is a scale-free network generated according to the uncorrelated configuration model[55] with γ = 2.5
and N = 300 nodes.
Goods Games on networks players can act as cooperators and
defectors at the same time.
METHODS
We consider a PGG game on networks[22] with a dynam-
ical resource allocation scheme that allows individuals to in-
vest higher quantities in profitable groups and reserve their
resources from unfavorable ones. Each node i of the network
is considered as a player participating in ki+1 different PGGs
with its neighbors. Participating in a PGG round each individ-
ual can decide to contribute (cooperate) a part of its resources
or act as free-riders (defect). For the fixed cost per player
scheme the total amount of resources for each round is fixed
to c and equal for all the players, whereas in the fixed cost per
game each player has a quantity (ki + 1)c. In case of coop-
eration, the contribution of each agent in a game is calculated
dynamically and depends on the payoff obtained by the player
in the previous round of the game. Specifically, the investment
of player i at time t+ 1 in the game where node j is the focal
player is defined as Ii,j(t+1) and for the fixed cost per player
reads as:
Ii,j(t+ 1) =
ceαΠi,j(t)∑
l∈νi e
αΠi,l(t)
, (2)
while in the fixed cost per game:
Ii,j(t+ 1) = (ki + 1)
ceαΠi,j(t)∑
l∈νi e
αΠi,l(t)
, (3)
where Πi,j(t) is the payoff obtained by agent i in the game
centered on node j at the previous time step, νi is the set of all
the first neighbors of node i and α is a parameter that allows to
differentiate between a static and homogeneous resource allo-
cation (α = 0) and heterogeneous distributions where higher
resources are invested in best performing games (α > 0). At
time t = 0, as all the previous payoffs are set to zero, the
contribution is divided evenly between all the games.
In this setting the payoff Πi,j(t) of player i in the game
where j is the focal player can be calculated as:
Πi,j(t) =
r
kj + 1
∑
l∈νj
Il,j(t)sl(t)
− Ii,j(t)si(t), (4)
where r is the synergy factor and sx(t) is a dichotomous
variable representing cooperation sx(t) = 1 and defection
sx(t) = 0 respectively. Summing over all the games in which
player i participates the total payoff earned by i at time t reads
as:
Πi(t) =
∑
j∈νi
Πi,j(t). (5)
At the end of each round players update synchronously their
strategies according to the finite population equivalent of the
replicator dynamics. Each player i selects with uniform prob-
ability one of her neighbors j and compare their respective
payoffs. If Πi(t) ≥ Πj(t) the player will keep its strategy in
the next time step otherwise, with probabilityP (i→ j) player
i will copy the strategy of j. We can calculate P (i→ j) as:
P (i→ j) = Πj(t)−Πi(t)
M
, (6)
where M is a normalization factor defined as the maximum
possible payoff difference between two players in the network
assuring that 0 ≤ P (i→ j) ≤ 1.
7Numerical setup
Numerical results presented in the text are the average of at
least 500 independent runs with randomly chosen initial con-
ditions. At the beginning of each run players are assigned ran-
domly one of the two available strategies (cooperate or defect)
with probability 0.5. The average density of cooperators and
the other quantities considered are evaluated at the stationary
state after a sufficiently long relaxation time (usually 5 · 104
time-steps) and then averaged over additional 103 steps. As a
substrate we employ scale-free networks generated according
to the uncorrelated configuration model [21, 55] with mean
degree 〈k〉 ≈ 4, 6, 8, exponents γ = 2.2, 2.5 and 2.7 and sizes
N = 103, 5 · 103 and 104. The results presented are indepen-
dent of the system size, γ and mean degree.
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